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Abstract
This paper combines the theory of optimal extraction of exhaustible resources with the theory of
greenhouse externalities, to analyse problems of global warming when the supply side is considered. The
optimal carbon tax will initially rise but eventually fall when the externality is positively related to the stock
of carbon in the atmosphere. lt is shown that the tax will start falling before the stock of carbon in the
atmosphere reaches its maximum. If, on the other hand, the greenhouse externality depends on the rate of
change in the atmospheric stock of carbon, the evolution of the optimal carbon tax is more complex. It can
even be optimal to subsidise carbon emissions to avoid future rapid changes in the stock of carbon, and
therefore future damages. If the externality is related to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere and there
exists a non-polluting backstop technology, it will be optimal to extract and consume fossil fuels even when
the price of fossil fuels is equal to the price of the backstop. The total extraction is the same as when the
externality is ignored, but in the presence of the greenhouse effect, it will be optimal to slow the extraction
and spread it over a longer period.
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1. Introduction
One main environmental challenge in our time is to avoid or reduce the impacts of global
warming. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the main greenhouse gas, and 70-75% of all CO2
emissions is due to combustion of fossil fuels (see for example Halvorsen et al. (1989)). In
most papers analysing the economics of global warming, the supply of fossil fuels is
modelled like any other good, and the exhaustibility of these resources is not considered.
There have been many studies on externalities from fossil fuel consumption and the depletion
of exhaustible resources (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Baumol and Oates (1988) and
Pearce and Turner (1990)), but few authors have tried to combine these two theories. Among
the first studies is Sinclair (1992) who analyses the impacts on consumer and producer prices
of a constant tax rate on energy use besides the development of a carbon tax. He argues that
in steady state, the ad valorem carbon tax should be falling over time. This is followed up in
Ulph and Ulph (1992). The authors study the evolution of an optimal carbon tax using
quadratic benefit and damage functions. They find that the carbon tax (in both specific and
ad valorem terms) should initially rise but eventually fall. Sinclair's conclusion, they argue, is
driven by very odd assumptions. Devarajan and Weiner (1991) use a two-period model to
analyse the importance of international global warming agreements, assuming that the
consumption of fossil fuels in period two is the difference between the initial stock of fossil
fuels and period one consumption. Finally, Withagen (1993) compares the optimal rate of
fossil fuel depletion without greenhouse externality with the case where this externality is
present.
In this paper I combine the theory of greenhouse externalities with the theory of exhaustible
resources using the framework of a simple model described in section 2. The first problem
analysed is the design of the optimal policy response. Most studies analysing the damage
from global warming, specify the damage as a function of the temperature level or
alternatively the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs). However, because
the ecology can adapt to a certain change in the climate, given that the rate of change is not
too high, it can be argued that what matters is the speed of climate change (e.g., the rate of
change in temperature or atmospheric concentration) and not only the level of temperature
itself. This argument is taken seriously by national governments, in the way that they have
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committed themselves to annual emissions restrictions of GHGs. 1 Thus, in section 3 the
optimal carbon tax is derived and compared for two different specifications of the damage
function; one in which the damage is due to the level of global warming, and the other where
damage is related to the speed of climate change.
The optimal policy response is analysed without considering possible substitutes for fossil
fuels. Even today there exist several alternatives to fossil fuels, however at higher costs. The
traditional result from the theory of a competitive mining industry facing a backstop
technology with a constant unit cost of extraction less than the choke price, is that the
industry will deplete the resource until the price reaches the cost of the backstop. At this
price, the resource is exhausted, and the consumers will switch immediately to the backstop.
Introducing external greenhouse effects, will, however, give some new results described in
section 4. I summarise the conclusions in section 5.
One example is the Norwegian Government which aims at stabilising the annual CO, emissions on 1989 level by
2000.
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2. The Model
This section describes the basic model of the paper. I assume that the social planner
maximises the present value of welfare to the global society given a competitive market of
fossil fuels. That is, he seeks an extraction path of fossil fuels which will
ISO
maximise
 5 e -11 -[u(x,) —c(A,)x,—D(S,)]dt
(1)
where x is the extraction (and consumption) of all fossil fuels in carbon units, u(x) is the
benefit of the society from fossil fuels consumption, c(A)x is the extraction cost, A, = Ix tdt
is accumulated extraction up to time t, S is the atmospheric stock of carbon in excess of the
preindustrial stock and D(S) expresses the negative externality of carbon consumption. r > 0
is a discount rate and to > 0 represents the depreciation of carbon in the atmosphere. These
parameters are fixed throughout the analysis. Further I set Ao = O and So > O.
The benefits from fossil fuel consumption are assumed to increase in current consumption
(ul(x) > 0), but the marginal utility is bounded above (u'(0) < co) and decreasing (u"(x) <
0 and u 1 (00) = 0). Define u(x) = p(x)dx, where p(x) is the consumer price. The utility
function, u(x), is therefore similar to the consumer surplus, and the marginal utility equals
the consumer price (u'(x) = p).
The total extraction cost, c(A)x, increases both with the current extraction rate (c(A) > 0 for
all A) and the cumulative extraction up to date (c'(A)x > 0 for x > 0). Furthermore, the
marginal extraction cost is constant, and I assume c"(A)x > 0 for x > O. This means that
the incremental cost due to cumulative extraction rises with the amount already extracted. No
fixed quantity is assumed for the total availability of the resource. However, in line with
Farzin (1992), only a limited total amount will be economically recoverable at any time. This
is due to the assumption c"(A)x > 0 for x > 0, which means that increasingly large
quantities of the fossil fuel resource can be exploited only at increasingly higher incremental
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costs. With c(A) — 00 as A — 00, it will be optimal to extract a finite amount of the resource
since the marginal utility is bounded above. Thus, on the optimal path, the cumulative
extraction reaches an upper limit, A, as t 00. This gives limit_ c(A)x = 0, i.e., c(Ã) < 00.
The damage from global warming is a function of the atmospheric stock of carbon.' I have
not taken into account the lags between the atmospheric stock of carbon and the climate, a
lagged adjustment process which is due to the thermal inertia of oceans (see Houghton et al.
(1990, 1992)). The stock is increasing in fossil fuel combustion, but decays with the
depreciation rate ô > 0, according to the atmospheric lifetime of CO2 . This is of course a
simplification. The depreciation rate is probably not constant, but will decrease with time
since a possible saturation of the carbon-sink capacity of the oceans as they get warmer, will
give a longer lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere (see Houghton et al. (1990, 1992)).
However, I stick to this assumption for the time being, since it is widely employed in
economic studies of global warming, see, e.g., Nordhaus (1991, 1993), Peck and Teisberg
(1992), Ulph and Ulph (1992) and Withagen (1993). The preindustrial stock is assumed to be
an equilibrium stock, meaning that the atmospheric stock will approach the preindustrial level
in the long run (S 0) when fossil fuels are exhausted. I assume that the damage can be
described by an increasing and convex function of the atmospheric stock (i.e., D'(S) > 0 and
D"(S) > 0 for all S > 0), but that they are negligible for the initial stock increase (D'(0) =
0). There is no irreversible damage which means that D(S) 0 as S O.
From the model, we find the consumer price as the sum of the producer price and a carbon
tax, v (see Appendix A). The producer price is the sum of the marginal extraction cost, c(A),
and the scarcity rent N. Thus, introducing a carbon tax separates the consumer price and the
producer price.
(2)	 p, = c(A,) +	 + v i
In Appendix A, it is shown that the extracted amount of fossil fuels will fall over time in the
absence of the externality (D(S) = 0
 V S). With a constant carbon tax, v, the total extracted
amount of fossil fuels will go down, but if the tax approaches zero in the long run (v 0),
the accumulated extraction equals total extraction in the absence of a carbon tax.
2 Alternatively we could specify the damage as a function of the temperature level. However, I simplify the matters
since the temperature is positively related to the atmospheric stock of carbon (see Houghton et al. (1990, 1992)).
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3. The Optimal Policy Response to Global Warming
Most studies analysing the damage from global warming assume that the damage is related to
the temperature level (see, e.g, Nordhaus (1991, 1993), Peck and Teisberg (1992) and
Kvemdokk (1994)). However, it can be argued that the damage will depend as much on the
rate of temperature change as on the absolute value itself, because the ecology is able to
adapt to a certain temperature change. There are however costs of adapting to a new stage
(see for instance Tahvonen (1993)). If the rate of climate change is high, there may be a
period of large damage until the original species have been replaced by more resistant ones.
Agriculture is a sector highly dependent on the change in temperature. Another example is
human beings, who are capable of adjusting to climatic variations, and can live under more
or less every climatic condition existing on earth. However, rapid changes in climate have
impacts on human amenity, morbidity and mortality (see Fankhauser (1992) and Cline
(1992)). As the optimal policy response to global warming may depend on how we specify
the damages, it is important to study the optimal carbon tax under the different specifications
of the damage function. The damage from global warming probably depends on both the
level of the climate as well as the rate of climate change. Therefore, damage functions taking
into account only one of these elements must of course be considered as extreme cases.
Analysing the two elements separately, however, points out some main features.
3.1 Damage Related to the Atmospheric Stock of Carbon
Consider first the case where damage is related to the atmospheric stock of carbon, as
modelled in section 2. The optimisation problem is solved in Appendix B. The optimal
solution can be implemented by a carbon tax (8 0) representing the discounted future
negative externalities due to accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere.
.0
(3)
	0 1 = fe -(r415)(1--t) D (5' v) dt
The optimal carbon tax has the following properties (see Appendix B), where 6 is the time
derivative of the tax:
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(4) lim,, 13, = 0
OS
(5) 6, = fe" )(" ) D "(ST)-gtdt
(6)	 hal t_ 6 1 =o
From (3) we see that the carbon tax is positive as long as marginal damage is positive, that is
as long as S > O. It will smoothly approach zero in the long run as the stock of carbon in the
atmosphere decays and reaches the equilibrium stock (see (4) and (6)). This means that the
tax will be positive even if the atmospheric stock declines after a certain time due to low
extraction and consumption of fossil fuels; the decay of carbon in the atmosphere is higher
than the additional carbon from new extraction (x < 8S).
Figure 1: The Optimal Carbon Tax when Damage is Related to the Atmospheric Stock of
Carbon
a=b
é t =	 e -(r. "— " D"(s r )-štdt
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The
 behaviour of the carbon tax over time depends on whether the carbon stock is increasing
or decreasing (see (5)). Assume that the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere has a one-
hump shape, i.e., the stock initially increases but eventually decreases. Actually, in Appendix
B, it is shown that this will be the solution. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the optimal
carbon tax over time. As long as 0 < (r + 8) < 00, the optimal tax will decrease before the
stock of carbon in the atmosphere decreases. This means that there exists a period with a
falling carbon tax and increasing stock of carbon in the atmosphere. When the stock of
carbon decreases	 < 0), the carbon tax should definitely be falling. 3 The intuition behind
this is as follows. We know that the marginal damage will be higher the larger is the stock of
carbon in the atmosphere. Assume first that r 00. Then, only damage in the current period
counts, and the tax will therefore be equal to the current marginal damage. Thus, the tax will
increase as long as
 Š > 0 and fall for
 Š < O. For r < 00 (and ô < 00), that is, the social planner
is not totally myopic and the lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere is not zero, future damages
will also count. Since the marginal damage will start falling in the future due to a decreasing
carbon stock, a unit emitted immediately before S reaches its maximum creates more damage
than a unit emitted when S is at its maximum point. On the other hand, a unit of carbon
emitted in the beginning of the planning period stays in the atmosphere when the carbon
stock is low. Thus, this unit creates less damage than a unit emitted when S is at its
maximum. The optimal carbon tax, which reflects all damages made by a unit carbon
emitted, will therefore reach its maximum between time 0 and the time giving the largest
stock of atmospheric carbon. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the carbon tax rises
initially, while it falls from time t onwards when the stock of carbon is still increasing. The
evolution of the carbon tax is consistent with the results of Ulph and Ulph (1992), who argue
that the specific carbon tax initially rises but should eventually fall. However, they do not
relate the behaviour of the optimal tax to the evolution of the stock of carbon in the
atmosphere, but only claims that the carbon tax should definitely be falling once fossil fuels
are exhausted.
3 For (r-1-6) = 0, i.e., if there is no discounting and the lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere is infinite, equation (5)
is no longer valid. In that case we can use the condition
 ô = (r+6)I3 - D'(S), which is derived from equations (24) and
(31) in Appendix B, and is valid for all values of (r+6). For (1+6) = 0, we get 6 = -1Y(S), that is, the carbon tax is
always falling and, therefore, has its maximum value at t = O. The intuition is the following. Since we have no
discounting and the carbon will stay in the atmosphere forever, a unit of carbon emitted today is more damaging than
a unit emitted in the future, simply because it stays around causing damage for a longer period.
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3.2 Damage Related to the Rate of Change in the Atmospheric Stock
of Carbon
As argued above, another alternative is to model the negative externality as a function of the
time derivative and not the level of the atmospheric stock. Some first attempts in this
direction have been made by Tahvonen (1993), Tahvonen et al. (1994) and Hoel and Isaksen
(1993). These papers, however, do not take into account the exhaustibility of fossil fuels.
It is reasonable to believe that there are costs of adapting to a colder (§ < 0) as well as a
warmer climate (§ > 0), and that these costs increase the higher is the rate of climate change.
Therefore, I assume that the damage is convex in the rate of atmospheric carbon
accumulation. Further, there are no damage costs for a constant climate (§ = 0). Hence, if
d(£) is the damage function, we have d(Š) > 0 for Š 4 0, and d(0) = O. I also assume that the
damages are negligible for marginal changes in the stock under a constant climate (§ = 0),
giving d'(0) = O. The convexity of damages means:4
(7)
	 cli(g) > 0 for S' > 0 A d i(g) < 0 for S' < 0
d"(Š) > 0 for all g'
The new optimisation problem is thus:
00
maximise e "1"' -[u(x	 ,Adt
(8)
4 Alternatively, we could argue that small changes in the climate do not make any damage. This can be specified
as d() = 4:1 1 ( 1 ) = 0 for IS I s K, where K is a constant. If K 6S, for all t, the decline in the atmospheric
concentration of CO, will never be large enough to make d'(Š) negative (as IŠ I = I6S
 I s K for x = 0). This will
simplify some of the results below, since in this case, the shadow price of the atmospheric stock, y, will always be non-
negative (see (10)). However, for g > K, we will still have the two contradictory effects described below (see (9)). In
paragraph 3.1 above, we could in a similar way argue that D(S) = Di(S) = 0 for S s M, where M is a constant. This
would not change the main results, however, the carbon tax would reach zero in finite time when S, M for all t.
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This model is solved in Appendix C where it is shown that the optimal carbon tax, a, can be
expressed as:
(9) = d"(Š,) - y,
where
 Tt is the shadow price associated with accumulated atmospheric stock up to t.
OD
(10) y, = 8 .fe -0-4) (T-o d /0,:d d,,
Consider first the situation with an increasing stock of carbon in the atmosphere (Š > 0).
Fossil fuel consumption (and extraction) increases the damage from global warming via
accelerated buildup of the atmospheric stock (represented by C•) in equation (9)), but on
the other hand, this leads to a larger stock in the atmosphere and therefore higher decay in
the future. A high decay will reduce the rate of change in the atmospheric stock, and hence
the damage from global warming. Note therefore, that while the shadow price of accumulated
atmospheric stock is negative in the first model where damage is determined by the stock
level (II = -8 < 0; see Appendix B), it is positive in the second model (y > 0) if Š > 0 for a
sufficiently long period.' This is also shown in Tahvonen (1993). Thus, a larger stock of
carbon in the atmosphere represents a cost if the damage is positively related to the level of
this stock, while it represents a benefit if the damage is positively related to the rate of
change in the stock as long as this stock is increasing for a sufficiently long period.
For Š < 0, an increase in fossil fuel consumption (and extraction) will reduce the absolute
value of Š, I Š I, and therefore the adaption costs. This effect gives a lower optimal carbon
tax, and is represented by CŠ) < 0 in (9). However, increasing fossil fuel consumption
gives a larger stock of carbon in the atmosphere, and therefore a larger decay of this stock in
the future. This leads to even lower values of Š, and higher adaption costs, in the future.
Thus, while the shadow price of accumulated atmospheric stock may be positive for Š > 0, it
is negative when Š < O.
5 Typically, the stock of carbon in the atmosphere will initially increase but eventually decrease (see Appendices
A and B). Therefore, the shadow price associated with accumulated atmospheric stock, y, consists of both positive and
negative elements as WO > 0 for S > 0 and WO < 0 for S < 0 (see equation (10)). This means that S has to be
positive for a sufficiently long period for y to be positive.
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Increasing fossil
 fuel consumption may therefore give two contradictory effects. From (9) we
see that the carbon tax can be negative or positive depending on which effect is the strongest.
This is also a different result compared to the model expressed in (1), where the optimal
carbon tax is always non-negative.
To study the evolution of the carbon tax, we first note the properties of y derived in
Appendix C, where t is the time derivative of y
(11) lim,œ y, =
IS
(12) = 8 f e -(r+6)(1.1) d"(Š)-(1,-8.5')dt
(13)
	lim, t, = 0
Using these properties and defining IT as the time derivative of a, we find that
As seen from (12) and (15), the behaviour of the optimal carbon tax depends on the
evolution of the marginal damage over time (which is
 äd'(Š)/ät = d"(Š).(i-)).
However, the behaviour of a is rather complex due to the two contradictory effects described
above. To get a further insight, I study the three different cases; Š
 = 0 Š > O and Š < O.
a) hg = 0
Due to the assumption CO) = 0, we see from (9) and (10) that a = -y for Š = O. This means
that the optimal carbon tax should be equal to the shadow price of the atmospheric stock,
 y,
but with opposite sign. y can be negative or positive as discussed above. Even if the current
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emissions make no change in the current atmospheric stock and therefore give no current
damage, it will be optimal to increase the emissions if the future atmospheric stock is
increasing for a sufficiently long period of time. Increased emissions will give a higher future
decay and reduce future damage. In this case it will therefore be optimal to subsidise
emissions. If the future stock is decreasing, we get the opposite conclusion.
b) Š > 0
If Š > 0 for a sufficiently long period of time, we see from (9) and (10) that a is positive if
and only if
(17) d"(Š) > y,
which means that the direct effect of an increase in the atmospheric stock of carbon is larger
than the indirect effect of increased future decay of this stock. However, even if the optimal
tax is positive, it is difficult to say anything about its evolution. From (15) we see that the
condition for a rising carbon tax is
(18) d ll(Š,)-(i t -agt ) - t t > 0
c) Š < 0
For
 Š < 0, an increase in extraction means reduced adaption costs (C.) < 0). This goes in
the direction of a lower carbon tax. On the other hand, increasing extraction means larger
stock and therefore higher decay in the future leading to higher adaption costs (y < 0). Thus,
the optimal tax should be positive if the second effect dominates the first, i.e.,
(19)	 Id 1(Š,)1 < I Y, I
Actually, for d' (.) < 0 and y < 0, this gives condition (17). The condition for an increasing
carbon tax is again given by (18).
For a decline in the atmospheric stock of carbon, it can therefore be optimal to have a
positive carbon tax. This confirms the result derived from model (1), but while the result in
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that model rests on the assumption that stock levels larger than the initial stock give an
external effect, the result in model (8) is due to the assumption of positive adaption costs
even for reductions in the stock.
Figure 2: Possible Optimal Carbon Tax Paths when Damage is Related to the Rate of
Change in the Atmospheric Stock of Carbon
In Figure 2, some possible time paths for the optimal carbon tax are illustrated. The
behaviour of the optimal carbon tax in this model is more complex than in model (1). If So
were equal to zero, initially the tax would be positive since we move from a situation with
no external effects to a situation with external effects. This would then reflect the
preindustrial situation. However, as So > 0, the optimal carbon tax can be negative as well as
positive in the beginning of the planning horizon. The discount rate, r, and the lifetime of
CO2 (reflected in 8) are important for the evolution of the optimal carbon tax. If the discount
rate is high, and the lifetime of CO2
 is long (8 is low), the future indirect effects may be
negligible. In that case, the optimal carbon tax is positive for Š > 0, while it is negative for Š
< O. In the long run, the carbon tax will steadily approach zero (see (14) and (16)).
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In both models, the optimal carbon tax will approach zero as time goes to infinity, see (4)
and (14). As shown in Appendix A, this means that the optimal extraction will approach zero
as time goes to infinity. It is also shown that even if the damage from global warming is
specified differently, the total extraction is the same.
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4. Optimal Depletion with a Non-polluting Backstop
Technology
So far, I have not explicitly considered the existence of substitutes for fossil fuels. However,
substitutes such as synthetic fuels, nuclear power, hydro power, biomass, solar and wind
power already exist. Assume that there exists a non-polluting perfect substitute for fossil
fuels, y, with an unlimited stock and a constant unit cost, E. In a competitive market, the
price will be equal to this cost since there are no stock constraints. By definition, a backstop
source is available in unlimited quantities at a constant marginal cost. The traditional result
from the theory of a competitive mining industry facing a backstop technology with the
constant unit cost less than the choke price, but higher than the initial marginal extraction
cost, is that the industry depletes the resource until the price reaches the cost of the backstop.
At this price, the consumers will switch immediately to the backstop (see Appendix D). This
result is also derived in for example Dasgupta and Heal (1979), but they assume a fixed
quantity of the exhaustible resource. The extraction path will be different in the presence of
external greenhouse effects. By introducing the non-polluting backstop into the model from
section 2, the social planner seeks to
maximise e ' -[u(x
 +y 1 ) -c(A 1 )x 1 -ty , -D(S ,)]dt
s.t. if, = x,
(20)	 Š t = x, -6 S
X I	0
y 0
c(0) < E < u 1(0)
The necessary conditions for an interior optimum are given in Appendix D.
In accordance with section 2, I define u(z) = Ip(z)dz, z = x+y, where p(z) is the consumer
price. Then, u'(x+y) = p. In Appendix D, it is shown that on the optimal path, the consumer
price has to satisfy the following conditions:
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p(x,+y,) = c(A,) +
 7 + 8, , x, > 0
+y,) = E, y, > 0
As the negative externality is a function of the atmospheric stock of carbon, the optimal
carbon tax, (3, has the characteristics derived in paragraph 3.1. In Appendix A, I show the
properties of the scarcity rent, N. Note that the evolution of this rent is given by:
(23) a(c(A i )
at
Taking time derivatives of (21) and (22), and using (23), we find the evolution of the
consumer price:
(24) 13, r75 6„ x, > 0
(25) /3, =0, y,
 > 0
For c(0) < C, the consumer price will initially be lower than the price of the backstop. This
gives x > 0 and y = 0 since p < E. In other words, only fossil fuels will be consumed
initially. In the absence of a backstop, the consumer price would increase and approach u'(0)
since p = u'(x). But since 'd < u'(0), the price will at some time reach E. At this price, we
can have x > 0 and y > 0 at the same time (see (23) and (24)). The condition for this is:
(26) 1 =
that is, the optimal tax is falling with the same rate as the producer price is increasing,
namely the discount rate times the scarcity rent.
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If the extraction of fossil fuels is so high that the consumer price rises above the price of the
backstop, it will not be optimal to consume fossil fuels due to the cheaper substitute. But if
we stop depleting fossil fuels when p = E, the stock of carbon in the atmosphere will
decrease	 = -8S < 0), and the optimal carbon tax will fall (see (5)). This means that the
consumer price of fossil fuels will fall below ë, which again makes fossil fuels economically
viable. Therefore, it will not be optimal to stop the extraction of fossil fuels. The optimal
extraction path of fossil fuels when p = ë is determined by:
(27)	 C = c(A t) + + 0,
When the consumer price of fossil fuels equals the unit cost of the backstop, it will be
optimal to consume both fossil fuels and the backstop. Fossil fuels will be extracted so that
the consumer price remains constant and equal to this unit cost.
The optimal consumer price path is illustrated in Figure 3a. The consumer price of fossil
fuels is constant and equal to the consumer price of the backstop technology (which is the
unit cost) from time ta
 onwards (see Figure 3a).
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Figure 3: Optimal Extraction and Consumer Prices with a Backstop Technology
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Figure 3b
 illustrates
 the optimal extraction path of fossil fuels. With the greenhouse
externality, both fossil fuels and the backstop technology will be consumed from time ta
onwards. The advantage of consuming fossil fuels instead of the backstop is the lower
production costs. The disadvantage is, however, the external effects. As the optimal tax
approaches zero as time goes to infinity (see (4)), the optimal fossil fuel extraction will also
fall and approach zero in the long run (see Appendix A). Thus, the extraction of fossil fuels
will fall over the entire time horizon.
In Figure 3, I have also compared the extraction path and the consumer price with the
corresponding paths in the absence of external effects. The total extraction in the presence of
the greenhouse externality will actually be the same as accumulated extraction without
externalities. In the latter case, the consumer price will reach sô" at time tb (see Figure 3a).
This means
(28) lim,1 {c(k) +} =
In the presence of external effects, the following condition must be satisfied:
(29) =	 {c(A) +	 ej
Since n — 0 as x 0 (see Appendix A) and #3 0 as t 00 (see (4)), the accumulated
extraction in absence of external effects is given by c(Ab) = E, while in the presence of
external effects we get c(Aa) = . Hence, Aa = Ab, meaning that accumulated extraction is the
same in both models. But while fossil fuels will be depleted in finite time in the absence of
externalities, greenhouse externalities makes it optimal to deplete fossil fuels in infinite time
since the optimal carbon tax converges at zero for t 00 (see Appendix A). Thus, the
greenhouse effect makes it optimal to disperse the depletion over a longer period.
As the total extraction is the same with the external effect as without, and the consumer price
reaches "d in finite time (as ë
 < u'(0)), the total extraction is higher in the absence of
external effects than with the external effects at time tb . Therefore, the extraction path
without externalities will be higher than the path were greenhouse externalities are present
(see Figure 3b). In the same way, in Figure 3a it is seen that the price path without
externalities will be lower than the corresponding path with externalities.
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5. Conclusions
Most papers on the economics of global warming concentrate on the external effects from
fossil fuels combustion without taking into account the exhaustibility of these resources. This
paper combines the theories of greenhouse externalities and non-renewable resources, to
analyse several aspects of global warming.
The basic model presented in section 2, defines the negative greenhouse externalities as
positively related to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere. The exhaustibility of fossil fuels
is modelled by increasing extraction costs in accumulated extraction. A carbon tax is used to
implement the optimal solution to this model. This tax should initially be increasing but
eventually fall and approach zero as time goes to infinity. It should start decreasing before
the stock of carbon in the atmosphere reaches its maximum point.
Changing the specification of the externalities to depend on the rate of change in the
atmospheric stock of carbon, completely changes the model. While the shadow price of the
atmospheric stock was negative in the basic model, indicating a cost of increasing the stock,
it is positive in this new model if the stock of carbon rises over a sufficiently long period.
This is due to an increase in the depreciation of carbon in the atmosphere when the stock of
carbon increases, which gives a lower rate of change in the future stock. Actually, this effect
can make the optimal carbon tax negative even for high concentrations of carbon in the
atmosphere.
The last problem analysed is the depletion of fossil fuels if there exists a non-polluting
backstop technology. If we ignore the external effects, the traditional theory gives the result
that the resource should be depleted until the price reaches the cost of the backstop. At this
price, consumers will switch immediately to the backstop. Taking into account the
greenhouse effect will give different time paths for prices and extraction. When the consumer
price of fossil fuels reaches the price of the backstop, it will still be optimal with fossil fuel
consumption, that is, both the backstop and fossil fuels will be consumed. This is due to a
falling carbon tax of fossil fuels, and therefore a fall in the consumer price if fossil fuels are
not consumed. Total extraction will be the same as for no external effects, but the green-
house effect makes it optimal to slow down the extraction and spread it over a longer period.
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Appendix6
A. The Competitive Equilibrium when there is an Arbitrary Tax on
Fossil Fuels
Let v, be an arbitrary tax on fossil fuels at time t (measured in carbon units). The optimal
consumption/extraction path under a competitive equilibrium is then derived from the
maximisation problem below:
maximise e -[u(xd-c(Adx,-v txpt
(1)
s.t. A, =x,
x 0
The existence of an optimal solution can be shown as follows. Assume c(0) > 0 and u'(00) =
O. It is easily seen that it never pays to have u'(x) - c(0) < 0 anywhere along a path, since
decreasing x on such intervals would then increase the integrand in the criterion, not only on
this interval but from then on and to infinity. Hence u'(x) - c(0) O. Choose a such that
u'(30 - c(0) < O. Then we can safely argue that x E [WI], and in fact that no optimal x, )1.
By Theorem 15, chapter 3, in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987), an optimal control exists. This
proof is also valid for the model presented in Appendix B.
The current value Hamiltonian for problem (1):
(2) H = u(x) - c(A 1 )x, - v +
The necessary conditions for an interior optimum:
(3) aH =u (x) - c(A 1 ) -v 1 +A, s 0, (=0 for x 1 > 0)
6 The symbols and the concavity/convexity characteristics of the functions are explained in the main text.
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(4) - rA _aH . cf(A)x,
at,
A, =x 1
e 11 1 1 A 1 = 0
Due to the assumption u'(0) < co, we know that on the optimal path A, will converge (see
section 2), i.e.,
(7) 0 < 1im11, A, = À <
Therefore, from (6) and (7) we get:
(8) limtœ e	 = 0
A, (< 0) is the shadow cost associated with cumulative extraction up to t. Thus, the scarcity
rent at time t, x t, is defined as
(9)
To show the characteristics of the scarcity rent, I first use (4) and (8) to derive A t, thereafter
use (9) to find:
00
(10) = 5e ll"c (A ,)x icbc
limt_. =hint_ fe'c I(A.)x,chl e
applying L'Hepital's rule and notifying that by (7) x t 0 as t	 we get:
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(12) = lim	 c 1(A")x  = 0
According to (12), the scarcity rent will converge at zero for t 00. This is due to the
increasing marginal extraction cost; The costs will be so high that an additional unit of fossil
fuels extracted will not add to the welfare.
To find the optimal extraction path, consider (3). For x, > 0, this condition is fulfilled with
equality. Then, applying u 1 (x 1) = p, (see section 2), we find:
(13) p, = c(A,)	 +v,, x i > 0
Thus, the consumer price is separated from the producer price via the carbon tax. Further, the
producer price is the sum of marginal extraction costs and the scarcity rent, i.e., c(A) + 7C t .
The behaviour of the consumer price over time is given by
(14) = C "(A 1 )x, + i + , x, > 0
using (4), (9) and 15, = u"(x,),Z„ we find
(15) =u ll(x,).,C, = r75 +1,, x1 > 0
a) Assume v, = = 0 for all t. Since it  > 0 for x, > 0 (see (10)) and u"(x,) < 0, we see that
< O. Thus, in the absence of a carbon tax the extraction of fossil fuels is falling and the
consumer price is rising over time.
b) Assume > O. Thus, we see from (15) that i < 0 as long as x, > O. Hence, with an
increasing carbon tax, the extraction of fossil fuels is falling and the consumer price is rising
over time.
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c) Assume if, < O. We see from (15) that k < 0 as long as x, > 0 if and only if
(16)
Hence, with a falling carbon tax, the extraction of fossil fuels may rise and the consumer
price may fall over a limited period of time. Since accumulated extraction of fossil fuels will
converge, extraction of fossil fuels cannot increase forever.
As
 Š = x, - 6S„ initially Š > 0 if x > esSo. But eventually Š < 0 as x, decreases and S t
increases over time. In the long run S 0 since x, 0 when t 00. Hence, if .i, 0 for V t,
the atmospheric stock of carbon will initially increase but eventually decrease if S0 is not too
high.
As A — À, the extraction will fall and reach or converge at zero. If x, converges at zero in
infinite time, we have x, > 0 for all t, and equation (3) is fulfilled with equality. Assume x,
	
0 as t	 where I = min { t: x, = 0} < 00, and consider the case where we have no carbon
tax. By taking limit of (3) as t I, and using it = 0 (since x, = 0 for t uf, see equation
(10)), we find,
(17) u "(0) s c(À), x, =0
However, (17) has to be fulfilled with equality (see also the proof for an optimal solution
above). If not, the last unit of fossil fuels extracted and consumed reduces the welfare since
it gives a higher marginal cost (c(À)) than marginal utility (u'(0)). Thus, À is determined by:
(18) u "(0) = c(ii)
With constant v > 0, and by taking the limit of (3) as t 00, we get
(19) u "(0) = c(A) + v
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By the same argument as above, (19) is fulfilled with equality. Thus, we see that with a
constant carbon tax, accumulated extraction of fossil fuels is less than without a carbon tax,
i.e., A < À.
If vt 0 as t 00, and by taking the limit of (3) as t cc, we are back to (18). Thus, if the
carbon tax approaches zero in the long run, the accumulated extraction of fossil fuels equals
the extraction in the absence of a carbon tax. However, as long as vt decreases, the producer
price has to increase, giving a positive extraction of fossil fuels. This is seen from equation
(15), which is fulfilled with equality according to the argument above. Hence, it will never
be optimal to stop depleting as long as the carbon tax is falling.
B. Damage as a Function of the Atmospheric Stock
Assume that there is a negative externality related to the atmospheric stock of carbon. If the
social planner seeks to maximise the present value of the welfare to the society, we get the
following optimisation problem:
4.11
maximise fe' lu(x,)-c(Adx,-D(S,)]dt
0
(20)
The current value Hamiltonian to the problem:
(21) H =u xt - c(Adx, - D(S 1 ) + 1 1x1 + p,-(x,-8S t )
The necessary conditions for an interior optimum:
(22) aH =u (x) -	 + A, +pt =0
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it - 	 = --all = c (A )xtaA,
jt 
-	 =	 = D
 '(S,) + 811,
S
A, =x
Št =x, -8St
limt __ e 11 	=0
e 11 11,S =0
Equation (22) is fulfilled with equality in accordance with Appendix A. Since A, is bounded
and will converge on the optimal path (see section 2), we find from (27):
(29) =0 A 0 < lim, A, =A<.0
As x t - 0 when t op, we know that S 0. S t is bounded since A is bounded, which means
that Theorem 16, chapter 3, with Notes 20 and 21 in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987) applies.
According to this Theorem:
(30) lim,_ e -11 p, =0
The characteristics of A t, the shadow cost associated with cumulative extraction, are
expressed in (8)-(12).
pt (< 0) is the shadow cost associated with accumulated atmospheric stock up to t. The
optimal carbon tax at time t, e t, is defined as:
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(31) 0, =
29
Using the same techniques as under the derivation of the scarcity rent in Appendix A
(replace
 c'(')x, by D' • ) and r by (r+8)), and given (30) and D'(0) = 0, we find the
characteristics of the optimal carbon tax:
• CO
(32) o t = fe 'r 415)(1-1) D 1(S t) dt
(33) lim
 O t = lim
D 1(S) 0
(r +6)
According to (33), the optimal carbon tax converges at 0 for t 00. The intuition behind this
is as follows. As S 0, there will be no cost associated with a marginal increase in the
atmospheric stock when t 00, thus 1.1 — O. As the shadow cost reflects the optimal carbon
tax, this will converge at zero for t 00•
Consider (32). Assuming (r+8) 0 and integrating by parts yields, after some manipulation:
(34)
-D 1(S )
13 = 
	 1	 1	 f -0-46)(T-0  ap /Gs )i' dt
t
	(r +6) 	r +8 )
. 
t 	at
Applying (31) and substituting (34) into (24) gives
ap "(Si)
ét = 5e -fr+6)(") 	 CIT fe "r 4 (T --t) D ll (S	 tclt
at
Then, substituting (31) and (34) into (24), and applying (33) and S 0, we get
(36)	 hint
_Õ = lim (r +6)e, - lim D "(S1 ) = 0
(35)
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To study the evolution of the optimal carbon tax, consider (35). Initially Š > 0 (if So is not
too high) since extraction and consumption of the fossil fuel give an initial buildup of the
atmospheric stock of carbon. But eventually Š
 < 0 due to the exhaustibility of fossil fuels
(see also Appendix A). Thus, from (35) we see that 8, will initially rise but eventually fall as
D"(S t) is always positive. Is it possible that the carbon tax, 8„ can increase and fall several
times? For O to be negative at some time t 1 , we need Š < 0 for some period of time after t 1 .
Then, for e, to first decrease and later increase, S t has to first decrease and later increase.
This means that k has to be positive in given time periods as Š can only change from being
negative to positive if there is an increase in x t. As was shown in Appendix A, the extraction
can increase if the fall in the tax is sharp enough. But for a rising tax, we know that the
extraction falls (X < 0).
(37) 6, = (r +6)
 O - D (S
To further study the evolution of the tax, consider the condition
which is derived from equations (24) and (31). Suppose that there exist t2 < t3 (see Figure
Al) such that:
6, = 0 for t =t2 A t = t3
(38)
6, > o for t2 < t < t3
Thus 6 is changing from negative to positive at t2 and back to negative at t3 since 6 is
continuous. This means that the tax has a local minimum at t2 and a local maximum at t3 . Let
o be the time derivative of O. From (37) we find:
(39)	 0, = (r +8)6, - D " (S
	As D"(S t) > 0 for all t, and O t2 > 0 we see from (39) that	 < 0. We also see that Clo < 0
gives k3
 > O. Assuming Š is continuous, there is a t* such that t2 < t. <t3
 and k. O. Thus, S
has a local minimum at t* . Since So
 > S t* and k3 >	 we must have xo > x t.. Thus i t > 0
for at least some value of t E [t2 ,t3]. This is a contradiction to the result in Appendix A that
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< 0 for 0, > O. Therefore, the optimal carbon tax cannot first decrease and later increase.
This rules out the possibility that the graph can have two humps or more. The optimal
carbon tax will therefore initially increase and eventually decrease and approach zero. This
also proves that even if the extraction of fossil fuels may increase for a given period of time,
Š will be negative only at the end of the planning horizon. Therefore, the accumulation of
carbon in the atmosphere and the optimal carbon tax will only have one-hump shapes when
the negative externality is related to the atmospheric stock of carbon.
Figure Al: An Impossible Evolution of the Optimal Carbon Tax and the Atmospheric Stock
of Carbon
2	 3
t2 t 	 3
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C. Damage as a Function of the Rate of Change in the Atmospheric
Stock
The optimisation problem when the negative externality is related to the time derivative of
the atmospheric stock is as follows:
00
maximise 5e •[u(x i ) --c(A i )x,-d(g ,)]dt
(40)
The current value Hamiltonian:
(41) H = u(x i ) - c(Adx, - d(x,-6S 1 ) + l ix, + y ,-(x, -M 1 )
The necessary conditions for an interior optimum are:
(42) äH
ax, 
=u (x) -c(A 1 )
 - d'(Š 1 ) + 1, +y = 0
(43)
	i t _	 _aH c l(Adx,aA,
t - ry, = --a---H
 = - d'(Š) +8y,
as,
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
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(48) 1im1 e "11 y ,S = 0
where equation (42) is fulfilled with equality in accordance with Appendix A. In same way
as in Appendices A and B, we find from (47) and (48):
(49) limt_	 =0 A 0 < limi_ A t =A < 00
(50)	 e '
 y , = O A lim„ S t = 0
The characteristics of A, are expressed in (8)-(12). y, is the shadow price associated with
accumulated atmospheric stock up to t. y, has the characteristics described below, using the
same derivation techniques as under Appendices A and B, and given (50), Š, - 0 when t oo
and CO) = 0:
OD
=	 e -(r+6)(" ) d 1( .5 t ) dt
8 d'(Š)lim t_ y = lim t 	(r +8)  = 0
ac ( 
= o5e -'r+6)(") 	 dt -= ô5e -(7. +6)(1-1) d ll(Š,c)-(i	 T)
at
limt_ t i = lim,
 (r +8) y, - lim 1
 õ d"(Š) = 0
According to (52), y, 0 as t co. As y, represents the increase in welfare of a marginal
increase in the atmospheric stock of carbon at time t, quite intuitively y - 0 since S, - 0
when t co. y, can be positive as well as negative since d'(Š) > 0 for g > 0 and d'(Š) < 0
for
 Š < O.
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
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Using u i(x) p„ we find from (42):
(55) pt = c(A t) - A 4-
 dVt)
	 t
Since p t is the consumer price and c(At) - A t is the producer price (see Appendix A), the
optimal carbon tax at time t, a t, is
(56) = d'(Š) -y t
It has the following properties,
(57) lim„ q = lim„ d'(gt) - lim, y t
(58) at = d ll(gt ) -(i t -8 ,S; t )	 t
(59)	 limt_ ót =lim, d "(Š) -(it -ôŠ) - lim,	 =
D. Extraction of Fossil Fuels given a Non-polluting Backstop
Technology
In the presence of a non-polluting backstop, y, the optimisation problem of the social planner
can be described as below. In this specification I use the basic model. Thus, I define the
negative externality to be a function of the atmospheric stock of carbon.
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maximise f e ' -[u(xt +yt ) -c(A)xt -eyt -D(St Adt
o
	(60)
	
s.t. A t =x
St = xt --6 St
x 0t
y t 0
c(0) < e < u "(0)
The current value Hamiltonian:
	(61)	 H = u(x t +) - c(A)x1 - eyt - D(S t ) + 1 tx t + pt-(x t -8 S)
The necessary conditions for an interior optimum:
____
aH 
=u (xt -i-yt) - c(A t ) + A t + lit s 0 (= 0 for xt > 0)
axt
aH . u /
,	
(xtiyt) 
- e s 0 (= 0 for yt > 0)
ay
i _ 4. . _aH . 
c /(Ad txt
t	 aA t
Ilt - Tilt = -
aH 
= D 
I(St) + Slit
as,
At
 = xt
Št =xt - õ St
limt_ e -n 1 tA t = 0
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
(66)
(67)
(68)
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(69) lim, e -rt[tt S t
 = 0
In accordance with Appendices A and B, we find:
(70) lim, e -"A t = O A 0 < lim, A t = A * < 00
(71) lim, e	 = 0 A lim, St = 0
The scarcity rent, n t, and the optimal carbon tax, O t, have the characteristics derived in
Appendices A and B. I define u(z) = Ip(z)dz, z = x+y, where p(z) is the consumer price.
Then, in accordance with section 2, u'(x+y) = p. Combining this with (9), (31), (62) and
(63) we get:
(72) p(xt+yt) = c(A t ) +
 i + e t, xt > 0
(73) p(xt +yt) = e, yt >
Taking time derivatives and using (9) and (64) we find:
(74) fit =	 ö t , xt >
(75)	 fi t =0, yt > 0
If there were no external effects, i.e., et = 0 for all t, we see that 15 > 0 for xt > 0 (as n t > 0)
and 15 = 0 for yt > O. This means that x and y cannot be positive at the same time. For c(0) <
Z, it will be cheaper to extract fossil fuels initially than to produce the backstop. Thus, ; > 0
and yt = 0 in the beginning of the planning period. But since > 0 for xt > 0 and ë < u'(0),
the price will increase and eventually reach Z. Further extraction of fossil fuels will increase
the consumer price of fossil fuels above Z. This will not be optimal since the backstop can
be produced at this price. Therefore, from the time pt equals "d onwards, we have xt = 0 and
yt > O.
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